Communication and Reporting for Threat Hunters: Insights from OffSec TH-200 Course module 3

In OffSec TH-200 Module 3, the importance of timely intelligence and effective communication in threat hunting is highlighted. Key concepts include leveraging Operational, Tactical, and Technical Threat Intelligence for detecting threats like Emotet, and employing the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) for secure and controlled information sharing during incidents to prevent data breaches.

Preston Zen

prestonzen.com

Communication and Reporting for Threat Hunters: Insights from OffSec TH-200 Course module 3

In today’s complex cybersecurity landscape, no organization can afford to work in isolation. For threat hunters, success hinges on two key factors: timely intelligence and effective communication. In Module 3 of the OffSec TH-200 course, I explored the importance of inbound and outbound communication, the role of threat intelligence, and the essential Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) for sharing sensitive information securely.

But how do these concepts play out in the real world?

Let’s walk through a scenario where the lessons from this module are critical in preventing a potentially catastrophic data breach.

Inbound Communication: Intelligence Feeds the Hunt

Scenario: A Threat to Financial Services

Imagine you’re a threat hunter for a major financial institution. One day, while reviewing threat intelligence feeds, you notice operational intelligence indicating chatter on the dark web about a new campaign targeting financial institutions. The chatter mentions a specific banking trojan known as Emotet, which has been revamped with advanced Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

Your team immediately flags this intelligence and starts investigating potential entry points. This type of information, classified as Operational Threat Intelligence, provides a valuable early warning system. It allows your team to look for specific Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) such as suspicious IP addresses, domains, and file hashes associated with Emotet. As this intel comes in real-time, it gives your team a head start on detecting and preventing a breach.

This information isn’t isolated; it’s part of a wider landscape that includes Strategic, Tactical, and Technical Threat Intelligence. Let’s break it down:

Strategic Intelligence: The long-term view — how threat actors, like those behind Emotet, may align with adversary groups that target sectors like finance. This is critical for risk assessments and executive briefings.
Tactical Intelligence: Focused on the specific TTPs used by Emotet. Knowing their tactics (e.g., phishing emails with malicious attachments) helps your threat hunters craft the right strategies to detect and prevent breaches.
Technical Intelligence: Specific details like the hashes of Emotet malware, malicious URLs, and C2 server IPs, which help detect the trojan at the technical level.

These multiple forms of intelligence feed into your Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), where you can correlate incoming alerts to specific IoCs associated with Emotet. Armed with this knowledge, you can move quickly, checking for any signs of activity in your network and locking down potential vulnerabilities.

Scenario: Containing a Leak While Keeping the Right People Informed

Now that you’ve identified a potential threat, the next step is communication. But how do you control who gets the information and when? Enter the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP).

An image to describe post

Imagine during your investigation, you find evidence that Emotet has penetrated one of your networks. This is sensitive information that needs to be handled with care. Sharing it too widely could cause panic or even tip off the attackers.

Threat Hunting Concepts and Practices - Insights from OffSec TH-200 Course module 1

The Offsec TH-200 course's Module 1 covers threat hunting in cybersecurity, focusing on proactive detection of threats as opposed to reactive SOC alerts. Threat hunting is categorized into in-house teams and third-party services, which enhance security by offering various detection solutions. The Threat Hunting Maturity Model outlines five levels of implementation based on data collection and analysis sophistication. Effective threat hunting consists of triggering a hypothesis, investigating, and resolving threats.

Understanding Threat Actors: Insights from OffSec TH-200 Course module 2 section 1

In OffSec TH-200 Module 2, Section 1, key cybersecurity threat actors are explored, including cybercriminals like script kiddies, hacktivists, and ransomware groups, as well as sophisticated APTs and insider threats. Each group possesses distinct motivations and impacts on organizations, necessitating robust defense strategies.

Ransomware Actors and Their Strategies: Insights from OffSec TH-200 Course module 2 section 2

Ransomware actors, motivated by financial gain, utilize tactics like phishing, exploiting vulnerabilities, and Initial Access Brokers to infect systems. The Ransomware-as-a-Service model enables lesser-skilled criminals to profit from these attacks. The attack process includes encryption, ransom demand, and payment typically in cryptocurrency. Modern strategies include double and triple extortion, combining data encryption with data theft to pressure victims.

Web-300 - Exam 3 - June 23 2024

The text provides connection information and instructions for two target machines. The goal is to bypass authentication and gain remote code execution. The tasks include identifying vulnerabilities, providing screenshots, and scripting exploits. Failure to follow instructions may result in zero points. The target machines are exact copies of debugging machines.

Offsec - Clue

The reconnaissance phase involved scanning the target IP address using Nmap, which revealed open ports and services. Further investigation focused on the web server and port 3000, which indicated the presence of a web application. Directory discovery techniques were used, including Dirbuster and Gobuster, which uncovered some directories with content. A remote file read exploit was found for Cassandra Web, allowing access to sensitive files. Passwords were revealed, but attempts to log in via SSH were unsuccessful. The Freeswitch service was also explored, but no successful exploits were found. Finally, using Samba, read permissions were obtained for backups, allowing access to archives of Cassandra and Freeswitch. The password for Freeswitch was obtained from a configuration file, but no further access was gained. Overall, the reconnaissance phase involved thorough scanning and exploitation of various services.

DEL